On November 26 1994, 40-42 Russian tanks from Kantemirov and Taman Divisions entered the city of Grozny (the Capital of Chechnya). Most of them were destroyed. 21 Russian servicemen were captured, others were killed or fled.
Russian Ministry of Defense disgracefully denied that those were Russian tanks and shamefully abandoned Russian servicemen in Chechnya.
Info on Wikipedia: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_o...
Below are excerpts from the book “Chechnya: Calamity in the Caucasus”, by Carlotta Gall and Thomas De Waal, with more details of the failed operation in Grozny on November 26, 1994.
“The FSK under the direction of its Deputy Director Yevgeny Savostyanov signed secret contracts with 47 tank crews from the Kantemirov and Taman Divsions outside Moscow. The plan was for 17 tanks to move on Grozny from Urus Martan in the south-west under the command of Gantemirov, while another 30 would roll in from the north from Tolstoy-Yurt.
The tank columns moved into Grozny at dawn on 26 November. It was a fiasco. Those of the tank crews who were not killed fled or were captured. A few days later one of the captured Russian soldiers told his story to reporters under the watchful eye of his Chechen captors in the basement of the State Security Building. Two days before the attack he was sent to control a demonstration. ‘THEY TOLD US NOTHING, they do everything in secret,’ he said. When they reached the edge of town his comrades fled and Chasov was captured, still having only vague idea where he was.
21 Russian servicemen were in captivity in Grozny, although it took a week for Moscow to acknowledge that they were indeed its soldiers.
A day after the debacle Pavel Grachev, the pug-faced Defence Minister, was questioned about Chechnya. He was extremely cheerful. First of all he said that he had for a long time taken ‘no interest’ in Chechnya, underlining that he had nothing to do with the arming of the opposition. He washed his hands of the captured men, saying they were not his but were probably mercenaries. Then he mocked the incompetence of the attack on Grozny and said, ‘If the army had fought, we would have needed one parachute regiment to decide the whole affair in two hours.’ The remark about ‘one parachute regiment in two hours’ became legendary and made Grachev a hostage to expectations.”
Russian Ministry of Defense disgracefully denied that those were Russian tanks and shamefully abandoned Russian servicemen in Chechnya.
Info on Wikipedia: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_o...
Below are excerpts from the book “Chechnya: Calamity in the Caucasus”, by Carlotta Gall and Thomas De Waal, with more details of the failed operation in Grozny on November 26, 1994.
“The FSK under the direction of its Deputy Director Yevgeny Savostyanov signed secret contracts with 47 tank crews from the Kantemirov and Taman Divsions outside Moscow. The plan was for 17 tanks to move on Grozny from Urus Martan in the south-west under the command of Gantemirov, while another 30 would roll in from the north from Tolstoy-Yurt.
The tank columns moved into Grozny at dawn on 26 November. It was a fiasco. Those of the tank crews who were not killed fled or were captured. A few days later one of the captured Russian soldiers told his story to reporters under the watchful eye of his Chechen captors in the basement of the State Security Building. Two days before the attack he was sent to control a demonstration. ‘THEY TOLD US NOTHING, they do everything in secret,’ he said. When they reached the edge of town his comrades fled and Chasov was captured, still having only vague idea where he was.
21 Russian servicemen were in captivity in Grozny, although it took a week for Moscow to acknowledge that they were indeed its soldiers.
A day after the debacle Pavel Grachev, the pug-faced Defence Minister, was questioned about Chechnya. He was extremely cheerful. First of all he said that he had for a long time taken ‘no interest’ in Chechnya, underlining that he had nothing to do with the arming of the opposition. He washed his hands of the captured men, saying they were not his but were probably mercenaries. Then he mocked the incompetence of the attack on Grozny and said, ‘If the army had fought, we would have needed one parachute regiment to decide the whole affair in two hours.’ The remark about ‘one parachute regiment in two hours’ became legendary and made Grachev a hostage to expectations.”
No Russian Soldiers in Chechnya, - The History of Russian Lies. | |
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